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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Economic insecurity is a problem in any economic systemo However, 
this problem becomes magnified in the capitalist order where periodic 
business recessions occur. Because of these recessions, severe hardships 
are placed on the worker whose sole means of livelihood is derived from 
employment in the industrial complex. 
During times of prosperity, most people will be employed. The prob-
lem of economic insecurity remains, however, for those few who are unem-
ployed. Furthermore, when the industrial complex, because of a general 
economic downturn, cannot provide employment for a large majority of 
those actively seeking work, the insecurity problem becomes greatly 
magnified~ , 
There are two basic solutions to the problem. The first "solution", 
which has been proposed by a few, is to change the type of economic 
system. Since this action is highly impractical, the alternate solution 
has been to try to solve the problem within the existing social and 
economic framework and, at the same time, to try to make the solution 
compatible with the objectives of the existing system. 
The American solution has been unemployment insurance. This plan, 
generally, meets the criteria outlined above. We can formulate broad 
principles upon which the program should rest. But these principles, 
like all other things, are subject to change. We expect certain results 
1 
2 
from programs designed to alleviate a specific problem. Do they achi eve 
their objectives? 
In 1958 and, again, in 1961, the Federal Government was of the be-
lief that the unemployment insurance system was not achieving its objec-
tives during recessionary periods. The result of this thinking was the 
passage of two acts, the Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act of 1958 
and the Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1961, designed 
to relieve the problem of a high number of workers exhausting unemployment 
insurance benefits. 
The purpose of this thesis is twofold. The first purpose is to 
examine the two temporary acts, given that they were necessary, and come 
to a conclusion as to which act was the most effective in tenns of bene-
fits paid, coverage, financing, and other related factors. 
The second purpose is to expose the ideas of different people and 
groups concerning the temporary extension of benefits. Do temporary 
extensions conform to generally accepted concepts of unemployment in-
surance? Does the extension of benefits turn the unemployment insurance 
program into a relief measure? 
In Chapter II, a brief sketch of the Tise of the unemployment in-
surance concept in the United States is presented. The latter part of 
Chapter II is concerned with the main provisions of the Federal Social 
Security Act of 1935 and the manner in which States have developed their 
own unemployment insurance laws. In surrrnary, some of the principles 
and characteristics that have developed as a result of our particular 
social insurance program will be discussed. 
Benefit duration provisions of State unemployment insurance laws 
are discussed in the first part of Chapter III. The last part of 
3 
Chapter III is devoted to a discussion of whether extended benefits vio-
late the unemployment insurance concept. 
Both the Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act of 1958 and the 
Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1961 are reviewed in 
Chapter IV. The economic factors leading up to the two acts, the provi-
sions of the acts, and the results of the two temporary measures are 
investigated. Finally, the TUC Act and the TEUC Act are compared as to 
their relative effectiveness in combating the problem for which they 
were designed. 
Chapter V presents the various arguments of pressure groups for 
and against either the proposed measures in their entirety or various 
provisions of the proposed legislation. Chapter VI presents the conclu-
sions derived from this paper. 
CHAPTER II 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 
Development of the Unemployment Insurance Concept 
The problem of economic insecurity resulting from unemployment was 
largely unrecognized in the United States until 1930. For almost 300 
years, from 1600 to 1890, "unemployment was in this country regarded as 
a problem of poverty and poor relief. 11 1 Even after 1890, and up until 
the time of the great depression, "unemployment insurance was definitely 
in an academic or discussion stage. 112 However, the severity of the great 
depression in 1929 awakened responsible people to the need for a more 
sophisticated approach to the unemployment problem. 
A discussion of the evolvement of the unemployment insurance concept 
will necessarily involve a summary of early relief measures, although 
these early measures did not deal specifically with the unemployment 
problem alone. 
Social thought concerning the victims of poverty in the United 
States was largely influenced by English custom and practice. Principles 
established by the (English) Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601 were largely 
1Domenico Gagliardo, American Social Insurance (2d. ed. rev.; New 
York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1955), p. 226. 
2Earl E. Muntz, Growth a.od Trends i.D. Socj a 1 Secqrity (New York~ 
National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., 1949), p. lOo 
4 
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carried over to the American Colonies. By today's standards, these prin-
ciples are the very antithesis of desired goals in present relief mea-
sures. Friedlander describes the colonial system in the following wayg 
Every town made provisions for the maintenance of the poor, supplying 
food, clo1hing, firewood, and household essentialso They ,Zthe recipients 
of reliei/ had to be residents for a statutory period, varying between 
three months and five years. Following English tradition, newcomers 
often were "warned out/' that is, ordered to leave the corrmunity unless 
they could provide security by bond of a resident in good standing. 
If members of such a family were found begging, they were whipped in 
the market place and forcibly returned to their former residence ••• 
Poor relief was gi ven mainly in two formsg (1) either as 10 out-
door relief" in kind (food, clothes, fuel), or (2) §Y "farming out'° or 
"selling out" the pauper to the lowest bidder ••• 
The philosophy underlying this sort of thought was that the pauper was 
a "morally deficient" person--a person who had created his own poverty 
and who should be punished. Yet poor relief also implied a public 
acceptance of responsibility for the indigent, and a belief that the 
indigent should not be permitted to starve. 
In addition to public relief on the part of towns and villages, 
other forms of relief were operative ~uring the colonial period. 
Church charities, which provided relief for their own members, National 
Benevolent Societies formed by various nationality groups, and philan-
thropic associations for aiding special needy groups supplemented the 
public effort. 4 
These same general principles continued to influence Ameri can 
thought down to the 1930's, although this is perhaps not surpris i ng. 
3wa 1 ter A. Friedlander, Introductj on .:t.o. Social Welfare (Englewood 
Cliffsg Prentice-Hall Inc., 1961), p. 68. 
4Ibid., p. 70. 
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American independence was hard won. The expansion of new frontiers a nd 
the hardship of early American life bred a national sense of self-reliance. 
Basic to the American philosophy was that an individual is responsible for 
his own prosperity. The unfortunate person who could not attain enough 
for subsistence was thought to be shiftless and lazy. Riches and wealth 
came only to the industrious. 
However, it is misleading to infer that no action was taken to 
alleviate the problem of unemployment before 1930. Labor unions were 
not entirely inactive. In fact, "the earliest American efforts toward 
unemployment insurance were sporadic schemes by labor organizations to 
provide out-of-work benefits for their members from union funds. 115 
The earliest American example of a union paying out-of-work benefits 
6 dates back to 1831. 
The characteristics of these programs may be sumnarized as follows: 
(1) a minimum length of service was required as a condition of eligibility, 
(2) a waiting period must elapse before benefits could be drawn, (3) the 
amount of weekly benefits was stipulated with minimum and maximum rates 
specified, (4) the duration of benefits was strictly limited, and 
(5) some provision for management of the unemployment fund was made. 7 
All of these ideas were later incorporated in the Social Security Act 
of 1935. 
Also, some interest in unemployment insurance was shown by various 
States. Several bills were introduced in the l egislatures of Wisconsin, 
5Muntz, Growth a.!ld Trends...._.__._, p. 10. 
6Gagliardo, American Social Insurance, p. 227. 
7Muntz, Growth a.!ld Trends 
---, p. 11. 
California, Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, 
largely as a result of unemployment created by the depression of 1920. 
These bills were introduced throughout the 1920's and all failed to 
pass. 8 
CycJjcaJ Fluctuatjons.--The philosophy described above was easier 
to justify before the industrial revolution. Before the early 1800's, 
American industry was in an infant stage. The primary source of em-
ployment was in the farming sector of the economy. "Until about the 
1890's, free land was to be had for the claiming. 119 Consequently, ours 
was an agrarian society with small towns and villages. This type of 
life not only strengthened personal ties within communities; it was 
7 
conducive to strengthening family relations. A destitute person, either 
a member of the community or family group, could rely upon support from 
other group members. Self-sufficiency was less difficult in an agrarian 
society. The farm family could raise its own food, make its own clothes, 
and, if necessary, provide for less fortunate families or community 
members. 
This way of life diminished in importance as industrialization 
began to spread. Migration from farm to city tended to loosen family 
ties. Service trades accompanied urbanization. More and more people 
became dependent on uncertain employment in the industrial complex while 
the growth of services replaced tasks which families formerly had done 
for themselves. The self-sufficiency of early American life gave way to 
8Gagliardo, American Social Insurance, p. 230. 
9u.s., Social Security Administration, Social Security in~ 
JJnited States, (1959), p. 2. 
8 
the increasing interdependence that characterizes our life today. 
Concomitant with industrialization came the cyclical swings in 
business activity that are characteristic of the unregulated capitalist 
order. Periodic recessions caused the loss of income associated with 
involuntary unemployment. Paul Douglas is of the opinion thati 
In an economy where each family or minute group consumed what it 
produced there would be little scope for such fluctuation but the case 
is otherwise in a society characterized bl large scale enterprise, the 
division of labor, and extensive markets. 0 
These cyclical fluctuations are reflected in unemployment estimates 
prepared by Douglas for the years, 1897-1926. As shown in Figure 1, 
Percentage 
Unemployed 
Source: Paul Douglas 
and Aaron Director, 
Ih.e Pra b J em .a.f J..I.c.a:n-
p J a )l!D e ot, p. 29. 
Figure 1 
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severe increases in the unemployment rate were recorded for 1908, 1914-
15, and 1921-22. Although this estimate does not cover all industrial 
employment categories, it should provide a picture of the fluctuations 
in unemployment. 
We have seen that there was some thought concerning unemployment 
insurance before 1930. The discussion relating to such programs would 
10Paul H. Douglas and Aaron Director, Ih.e Prahl em .a.f JJoempJ ayroeot 
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1931), p. 167. 
9 
reach its height during recessionary periods, and then the following pros-
perity would suddenly stifle the discussion as quickly as it had started. 
Ib.e. Depression .oi .l.229..--All of the relevant economic indicators 
turned downward shortly before the stock market crash of 1929 or immed-
iately thereafter. Gross National Product, as shown in Table 1, dropped 
Table 1 
SELECTED ECON~IC INDICATORS, 1929-34 
Indicator 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 
Gross National Product 
(Billions) 104.4 91.1 76.3 58.5 56.0 65.0 
Wage and Salary Dis-
bursements (Billions) 50.4 46.2 39.1 30.5 29.0 33.7 
Per Capita Disposable 
Income (Dollars) 682 604 514 390 364 411 
Saving as a Percentage 
of Disposable Income 5.1 4.6 3.9 -1.2 -1.3 0.2 
Corporate Profits Before 
Taxes and Inventory Val-
uation Adjustment (Billions) 10.1 6.6 1.6 -2.0 -2.0 1.1 
Rate of Unemployment 3.2 8.7 15.9 23.6 24.9 21. 7 
Average Weekly Hours 
Worked 44.2 42.1 40.5 38.3 38.1 34.6 
Average Weekly Earnings 
(Dollars) 24.76 23.00 20.64 16.89 16.65 18.20 
Source: Compiled from, U. s., Office of Statistical Standards, .lSt.62 
SuppJement .:t.o. Economic Indicators--HistoricaJ a.ad. Descriptive 
Ea c~ground. 
10 
from 104.4 billion dollars in 1929 to 56o0 billion dollars in 1933--a de-
cline of over 46 per cent. Over the same period of time, Per Capita Dis-
posable Income declined 46 per cent while Wage and Salary Disbursements 
were down 42 per cent. 
After 1929, unemployment rose rapidly and did not start to decline 
until 1934. During 1933, 24.9 per cent of the labor force was unemployed. 
It was not until 1941, when America entered World War II, that the rate 
fell below 10 per cent. 
The increase in unemployment is vividly reflected in the Savings as 
a Percentage of Disposable Income figure. As unemployment mounted, more 
and more people had to rely on past savings, borrowing, and relief to 
survive. By 1932, the nation, in the aggregate, was spending more than 
its disposable personal income. Saving as a Percentage of Disposable 
Personal Income was -1.2 and -1.3 per cent in 1932 and 1933 respectivelyo 
Also, savings, as a "cushion" against loss of income, was infringed 
upon by the severe losses taken in the stock market. Almost overnight, 
billions of dollars of "paper wealth" was destroyed by the decline in 
stock prices. Added to this misfortune was the failure of many banks 
and the subsequent defaults on demand deposits and savings accounts. 
The wage earner was in a severe plight. Instead of getting better, 
business conditions continued their downward movement. For most wage 
and salaried people, their accumulated savings were not enough for any 
protracted period of unemploymento Not only were personal reserves in-
adequate, but the resources of local governments, kinship groups, and 
private charitable organizations were quickly exhaustedo 
As mentioned earlier, some workers were protected by various union, 
employer, and union-employer plans. However, the coverage was very 
11 
limited. "In 1934, about 100,000 workers were covered by trade union plans 
and about 65,000 by joint union-management plans ••• Another 70,000 were 
covered by voluntary company plans ••• "ll Compared to the number of 
workers unemployed during 1934 (11,340,000), those covered by these plans 
constituted only 2.07 per cent of the total unemployed. 
Dm:atjpn .of llnempJoyroeot, .l.929.-,33.--Perhaps the most vivid illustra-
tion of the hardship created by prolonged recessionary periods is found 
in data relating to the duration of unemployment among unemployed persons. 
As one might expect, duration of unemployment rises sharply during reces-
sionary periods and then declines when business conditions improve. 
Data from a Buffalo, New York survey show the trend in unemployment 
duration of males for the years, 1929-33. The two extreme length-of-
duration classifications (Under Two Weeks and Fifty-two Weeks and Over) 
best portray the change that occurred from 1929 through 1933. In 1929, 
only 9.3 per cent of the unemployed were jobless 52 weeks or over. 
However, a steady increase was noted for each year until 68.2 per cent of 
unemployed persons had been jobless for one year or more in 1933. It is 
evident that as the depression progressed, a larger and larger proportion 
of the unemployed moved from the short-term unemployment category to the 
long-term category. 
The severity of the depression again stimulated State interest in 
unemployment compensation. Numerous bills were presented to State legis-
latures in the 1930 1s. "In 1933, for example, 83 bills were introduced in 
12 23 States but none was enacted." Bills had passed one house of the 
11 U. s., Bureau of Employment Security, EmpJ oyweot Security Bevi ew, 
XXII (August, 1955), p. 5. 
12Ibid., p. 6. 
Table 2 
DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT OF ALL MALES ABLE AND WILLING TO 
WORK BUT UNABLE TO FIND JOBS, BUFFALO, NEW YORK, 1929-33 
Per Cent of Unemployed 
Duration of Unemployment 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
Under Two Weeks 15.8 4.3 2.6 1.4 2.7 
Two to Four Weeks 22.2 7.9 5.0 2.7 5.2 
Four to Ten Weeks 30.4 21.0 12.7 6.3 10.1 
Ten to Twenty Weeks 12.3 17.9 13.4 7.8 5.7 
Twenty to Thirty Weeks 6.2 14.3 11. 7 10.7 4.4 
Thirty to Forty Weeks 3.1 7.9 6.4 5.9 2.3 
Forty to Fifty-two Weeks 0.7 5.6 5.2 5.1 1.4 
Fifty-two Weeks and Over 9.3 21.6 43.0 60.1 68.2 
12 
Source: u. s., Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly .Lal:2C.l: Review, XXXVIII 
( 1934), p. 526. 
legislature in several States, but were defeated in the other house as a 
result of opposition on the part of employer groups. In their arguments, 
they maintained that the cost of unemployment insurance would be too 
high in the midst of the depression and that the increased costs would 
place them at a competitive disadvantage with employers of other States~ 13 
These bills were proposed because of the depression. However, a 
precedent had been set. In January, 1932, the Wisconsin legislature en-
acted the first unemployment compensation law, largely through the efforts 
13 
of Professor John R. Commons. It was not until 1935 that six other States, 
acting in anticipation of the Social Security Act, passed unemployment in-
surance laws. 14 
The Federal Social Security Act of 1935 
Wisconsin paved the way for a more comprehensive approach to the 
unemployment problem via social insurance. The Federal Government became 
increasingly aware that the unemployment problem was national in scope 
and should be handled under the auspices of the central government. 
In 1933, the Federal Emergency Relief Act was passed. This act pro -
vided the first direct Federal grants to States for unemployment relief. 
Later, in 1934, the Committee on Economic Security was created by the 
President to study problems and recommend legislation on economic se-
curity. The Committee reported on January 17, 1935 and, at that time, 
the Economic Security Bill was introduced. In April, the Economic 
Security Bill was replaced by the Social Security Bill. After passing 
both houses, the bill was signed into law by President Roosevelt on 
August 14, 1935. 15 The Social Security Act was a measure: 
To provide for the general welfare by establishing a system of Federal 
old-age benefits, and by enabling the several States to make more adequat e 
provision for aged persons, blind persons, dependent and crippled children, 
maternal and child welfare, public health, and the administration of their 
unemployment compensation laws; to establish a Social Security Board; 
to raise revenue; and for other purposes.lo 
14Ibid. 
15social Security Administration, Social Security i.Ll .the United 
States, p. 42. 
1°rhe above and summary of the Social Security Act that follows are 
taken, unless otherwise noted, from: u. s., Congress, Senate, Compilation 
.ai .the Social Security .La.ws., 84th Cong., 2d Sess. , 1957, Document 156. 
14 
We will be concerned solely with the unemployment insurance provisions. 
Ib.e. Federa)-.s:t.a.i.e Relationship.--The unemployment insurance provisions 
of the Social Security Act allowed considerably more latitude on the part 
of States than did other aspects of the programo Loose guidelines were 
established within which States could operate relatively unhamperedo 
An employer was defined as a person who employed eight or more work-
ers on each of 20 or more days in the year, each day being in a different 
17 
calendar weeko However, certain classes of employees were not coveredo 
Excluded from coverage were agricultural laborers; domestic servants; 
Federal, State, and local government employees; employees of non-profit, 
charitable, educational, literary, scientific, humane, or religious 
organizations; persons working for their son, daughter, or spouse; 
children under 21 years of age working for their father or mother; mari-
time workers; and other miscellaneous worker groups. 18 
Starting January 1, 1936, a tax of one per cent on the first $3000 
of an individual employee's wages was levied on all employers. This tax 
rate increased to two per cent in 1937, and was maintained at three per 
cent for years after 1937. However, a stimulus was provided to the States 
to enact individual unemployment insurance laws through the tax offset de-
vice. Employers could be exempt from 90 per cent of the Federal tax by 
paying unemployment taxes to the State government, providing the State 
had an approved unemployment insurance law. 
17As of January 1, 1955, the number of employees was reduced from 
eight to four. 
18Federal civilian employees, war veterans, and maritime workers 
are now covered under the law. These groups are subject to State regula-
tions. However, States are reimbursed by the Federal Government for 
benefit costs paid to Federal civilian employees and war veterans. 
15 
Administrative expenses incurred on the part of States would be paid 
by the Federal Government out of the portion of the unemployment tax em-
ployers pay directly to the Federal Government. The amount of money a l l o-
cated to each State for administrative expenses was detennined by the 
Secretary of Labor and was based on the population of the State, an esti-
mate of the covered employment in the State, and other relevant factors. 
It is evident that a State would want to comply with the Federal law. 
In effect, if a State did not comply, all revenues collected from employ-
ers within the State would go into the Federal unemployment account. 
Consequently, no reciprocal benefits would accrue to a State without an 
unemployment insurance law. 
The Federal law made compliance relatively easy. Several conditions 
were established for compliance. The State law was required to have pro-
vision for: (1) a method of benefit payment that was reasonably calcu-
lated to insure full payment of unemployment compensation when due, 
(2) payment of unemployment compensation solely through public employment 
offices, (3) opportunity for appeal by a person denied benefits, (4) a 
method whereby payments received in the unemployment fund of a State 
would immediately be paid to the credit of the Federal unemployment trust 
fund, (5) the expenditure of all money withdrawn from the unemployment 
fund solely for payments of unemployment compensation, exclusive of 
administrative expenses and erroneous credits and debits, and (6) non-
denial of compensation to an otherwise eligible individual for refusing 
to accept new work if the position is vacant due directly to a strike, 
lockout, or other labor dispute, if the wages, hours, or other conditions 
of the work offered are substantially less favorable to the indi vidual 
than those prevailing for similar work in the locality, and, if as a 
16 
condition of being employed, the individual would be required to join a 
company union or refrain from joining or resign from a bona fide labor 
union. 
A trust fund known as the unemployment trust fund was established in 
the Treasury. All revenues collected by States in connection with their 
unemployment compensation laws are paid into the fund. However, the 
funds of ea ch State are eannarked for payment of benefits within that 
Stateo Provision is made for the investment of "surplus" funds ( funds over 
and above expected withdrawals) in interest-bearing securities of the 
Federal Government. Interest receipts accruing from this investment are 
allocated to State accounts on the basis of a State's average daily 
balance. 
Also, a Federal unemployment account was established within the fund. 
The excess of Federal unemployment taxes collected over and above adminis-
trative expenditures are credited to this account. 
As noted, States were required under law to transfer tax collections 
to their account in the Federal trust fundo Also, withdrawals are made 
only for the purpose of benefit payments. An arrangement such as this 
safeguarded the financial responsibility of such a system. 
State Unemployment Insurance Laws19 
Shortly before the Social Security Act was approved, six States, 
acting in anticipation of the Social Security Bill, passed unemployment 
19rhe discussion of State unemployment insurance laws will tend to 
center around recent (as of January 1, 1962) provisions of these laws. 
Generally speaking, since the inception of these laws, provisions re-
garding coverage, benefit amounts, and benefit duration have been lib-
eralized. Any discussion of trends in these, or other provisions in 
this chapter will be limited. 
17 
insurance laws. In 1936, the Wisconsin law was modified to fit into the 
Federal law. Also, the first unemployment benefit check was issued by 
Wisconsin on August 17, 1936. By July, 1937, all 48 States and the 
District of Columbia, Alaska, and Hawaii, had enacted unemployment laws 
conforming to the Federal code. By July, 1939, all of the above States 
were paying unemployments benefits.20 
The broad provisions of the Federal Social Security Act of 1935 have 
been outlined above. Within the framework of the Federal law, States 
maintain a high degree of autonomy. First, we will look at the general 
provisions of State laws and then inspect the principles that have evolved 
as a result of the American unemployment insurance system. 
GoveraQe.--For purposes of Federal taxation, the Social Security Act 
specified that employers with eight or more employees on at least one day 
of each of 20 weeks would be subject to the unemployment tax. Later, in 
1956, the number of employees was changed to four or more on at least one 
day of each of 20 weeks in a calendar year. State laws tend to follow the 
precedent set by the Federal Government. All States now have laws that 
21 provide for coverage of employers of four or more employees. Some 
States provide for coverage for firms with less than four employees. 
Twenty-eight States cover employers with four or more employees, four 
States specify cov~rage for firms with three or more employees, and 20 
States cover employers with one or more employees. 
The types of employment excluded from coverage under the Federal law 
20 ( Bureau of Employment Security, Employment Security Review, August, 
1955), pp. s-10. 
21u. s., Bureau of Employment Security, Comparison .o..f. .s.:t.a..1..e 
Unemployment Insurance .La.w.s. as. .o..f. ,January 1, .1.9.62, (1962), p. 1. 
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are generally excluded by States. Agricultural labor is exempt in all 
States, except Hawaii and the District of Columbia, where agricultural 
employment on large farms is covered. 23 With the exception of New York, 
domestic servants are excluded from coverage. Also, most States do not 
cover employees of non-profit, humanitarian organizations. 
Employees excluded from the original Social Security Act (Federal 
civilian employees, maritime workers, and war veterans), and later 
brought under the act, are also covered by the States. The Federal 
civilian employees and war veterans are subject to the provisions of the 
respective State laws. States are later reimbursed by the Federal 
Government for the cost of benefits paid to these groups. 
Employees of State or local governments are now covered by 32 States. 
State and local government workers were excluded from coverage under the 
Social Security Act since the Federal Government cannot tax State or 
local governments or their instrumentalities. 24 
Fipapciog.--Trust fund arrangements and financing provisions of the 
Social Security Act have been discussed above. 
The Federal Government, after 1937, taxed employers at the rate of 
three per cent on the first $3000 earned by each employee. Employers, 
by contributing to the unemployment fund of a State with an approved 
unemployment insurance law, can be forgiven 90 per cent of the Federal 
tax. Therefore, employers are liable for Federal taxes amounting to 
23Bureau of Employment Security, Comparison .o..f .s.ta.:t.e ............... , p. 9. 
24Ibid., p. 12. 
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0.3 per cent of their taxable payrolls. 25 Only three States requ i r e 
employee contributions. 
The percentage of taxable payroll that an employer pays to a State 
fund varies with the employer's past employment record. Employers having 
a record of stable employment "earn" a lower contribution rate. 26 
The range of minimum State contribution rates varies from 0.0 per 
cent to 1.5 per cent, while maximum State rates range from 2.7 per cent 
to 4.4 per cent. Over 1/2 the States have a minimum rate of either O.O 
per cent or 0.1 per cent. The most frequently occuring maximum rate is 
27 2.7 per cent. Average employer contribution rates as a percentage of 
taxable wages are shown in Table 3 for the years, 1938-59. Generally, 
there has been a gradual decline in the average rate since 1938. But 
since 1954, the trend appears to have been reversed and a gradual in-
crease has set in. 
Benefits.--No Federal standards were created for benefit amounts in 
the Social Security Act. As a result, States have developed their own 
formulas for computing benefits to be received by unemployed workers. 
Nearly all States determine the weekly benefit amount by taking some 
fraction of the worker's high-quarter earnings in the base period. A 
base period is the 52 weeks preceding either application for or receipt 
25The Federal payroll tax increased to 0.4 per cent, effective 
January 1, 1961. A temporary increase to 0.8 per cent of taxable payroll 
is in effect for 1962 and 1963 as a result of financing the Temporary 
Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1961. 
26For a discussion of the various types of formulas used to compute 
the contribution rate, seeg Bureau of Employment Security, Comparison 
.o.f 5.:ta.t.e ............... , p. 22. 
27Bureau of Employment Security, Comparison a.f S1a..:t.e ...._...._-, p. 22. 
Year 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
Source: 
Table 3 
AVERAGE Bv\PLOYER CONTRIBUTION RATE AS A PERCENTAGE OF 
TAXABLE WAGES, NATIONAL AVERAGE, 1938-59 
Rate Year Rate Year Rate 
2.70 1946 1.43 1953 1.30 
2.72 1947 1.41 1954 1.12 
2.69 1948 1.24 1955 1.18 
2.58 1949 1.31 1956 1.32 
2.19 1950 1.50 1957 1.31 
2.09 1951 1.58 1958 1.32 
1.92 1952 1.45 1959 1.70 
1.70 
Bureau of Employment Security, Ha odbaak .o.f JJoeropJ ayment 
Insurance FioaociaJ Da.:ta., J9.38-6J. 
of benefits, depending on the respective State law. 
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To qualify for benefits, a worker must have earned a specified mini-
mum amount of wages, worked a specified period of time, or both, during 
the base period. The qualifying formula in most States is some multiple 
of either high-quarter wages (in the base period) or the weekly benefit 
amount. 28 The purpose of such provisions is to require a certain degree 
of attachment to the labor force on the part of the benefit recipient. 
In addition to providing benefits according to a benefit formula 
based on high-quarter earnings (or other formulas), all States have 
28Ibid., pp. 49-53. 
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established maximum and minimum weekly benefit amounts. The minimum 
benefit amount ranges from $3.00 to $17.00, while over 1/2 the States 
pay $10.00 as a rninimum. 29 Maximum benefits range from a low of $30.00 
per week to a high of $55.00 per week. 30 Most of the maximum benefit 
amounts fall in the range of 32-40 dollars per week. 
The intention of State legislatures was to provide for benefits that 
would compensate for approximately 50 per cent of the loss of wages due 
to unemployment. For example, assuming there are 13 full weeks to a quar-
ter and there is no unemployment during the quarter, a formula granting 
1/26 of high-quarter wages will yield a benefit amount that is approxi-
mately 50 per cent of the weekly wage. However, if the maximum benefit 
allowed does not keep pace with the increase in wage rates, the 50 per 
cent criterion is destroyed. The trend is explained as follows: 
The rise in average weekly wages has been relatively greater than 
the increase in the maximum weekly benefits. As a result, the propor-
tion of average weekly wages represented by the maximum weekly benefit 
has declined. In December 1939, for example, the maximum weekly bene-
fit in 49 States was 50 per cent or more of the average weekly wage; in 
15 of these States it was 71 per cent or more. By December of 1945, 
the maximum weekly benefit was 50 per cent or more of the average weekly 
wage in only 12 States ••• By June 1955, despite the increase in the 
maximum weekly benefit in 28 States this year /j.95r:;l, the maximum weekly 
benefit was 50 per §int or more of average weekly wages paid in 1954 in 
only 7 States ••• 
Several States have increased their maximum weekly benefits since 
1955. As of May 1, 1960, 12 States have maximum benefit amounts that 
29some States provide an extra amount for persons with dependents. 
The data used applies to persons without dependents. 
30rbid. (Puerto Rico has a maximum of $16.00). 
31 Bureau of Employment Security, Employment Security Review, 
(August, 1955), p. 33. 
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are equal to or exceed 50 per cent of the average weekly wageo 32 
Another indicator that expresses the adequacy of benefit amounts is 
the ratio of average weekly benefits to average weekly wageso Although 
the expansion of base-period earnings of claimants has caused the average 
weekly benefit amount to rise steadily since 1939, the increase in 
average weekly wages increased at a more rapid rateo The ratio of bene-
fits to wages has fallen from 42 per cent in 1939 to 35 per cent in 1959 
--a trend that further accentuates the need for more liberal benefit pro-
. . 33 
visions. 
Benefit duration provisions are inextricably linked to past earnings 
and, consequently, benefit amounts. However, discussion of the different 
aspects and problems of benefit duration is reserved for Chapter III, and, 
in a sense, the remainder of the paper. 
Principles and Characteristics of Our Unemployment Insurance System 
Gradually, as the unemployment insurance system has grown, some 
features of the program have been established on a seemingly permanent 
basis. A set of clearly defined objectives, however, has not been estab-
lished. Although certain general criteria are advocated, modifications of 
the program tend to respond "to the demands of pressure groups or to the 
needs of administrative considerations. 1134 Pressure group influence is 
32u. s., Bureau of Employment Security, Employment Security Review, 
XXVII (August, 1960), p. 13. 
33Ibido, p. 12. 
34wi11iam Haber and Wilbur J. Cohen 9 ' 0The Present Status of Unem-
ployment Insurance in the United States, io Socia 1 Securityg Programs, 
Problems, a.nd Poljcjes, ed. Haber and Cohen (Homewood, Illinois g Richard 
D. Irwin, Inc., 1960), p. 240. 
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treated in a subsequent chapter of this paper. The following discussion 
will center around some of the avowed objectives and "permanent" features 
of unemployment insurance. The reader should keep in mind that the 
following criteria are subject to discussion and diverse opinion. 
Statement .oi. Purppse.--A formal statement of the purpose of unemploy-
ment insurance is provided by the Bureau of Employment Security; 
Unemployment insurance is a program of short-term insurance for the 
payment of benefits to workers as a matter of right during unemployment 
which is beyond their control. The program is designed to provide pro-
tection only to workers who are ordinarily employed, who are currently 
unemployed due to lack of suitable work, and who are ready, willing, and 
able to accept such work. The primary objective of benefit payments is 
to replace enough of the current wage loss of unemployed workers who 
meet the program's requirements so that most such workers need not tur~ 
to other programs for aid, under normal and recession conditions ••• 5 
Notice that unemployment insurance, as defined, is definitely a 
short-term concept, "inadequate to deal with serious economic depressions 
or with joblessness in 'depressed' areas suffering from chronic unemploy-
ment.1136 Furthermore, "the program is /.i.1s;J designed ••• for wage 
earners whose regular and recent attachment to the labor market is clear-
ly established. 1137 Generally, a wage earner whose unemployment extends 
for a long period of time should receive aid in forms other than unem-
ployment compensation. 
Benefits.--Closely related to the insurance principle is the payment 
of benefits as a right as opposed to payment on the basis of need. The 
justification for this approach is subjective and directly involves the 
35 u. s., Bureau of Employment Security, tlnemplpyment Insuranceg 
Pqrpos es and Pri ncj pl es (December, 1950) , p. 1. 
36 Haber and Cohen, "The Present Status ••• , 0' Social Security ...._.__.._ 9 
p. 255. 
37Ibid. 
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pride and self-respect of the worker. To maintain this important element 
in unemployment insurance, benefits are tied to past earnings. As a re-
sult, benefit payments reflect, to some degree, the past productivity of 
the benefit recipient. 
Benefit amounts, as we have seen, should compensate for at least 50 
per cent of the wage loss due to unemployment. This amount should be 
enough to pay for certain nondeferrable expenses of the insured person. 
However, among low wage and salary groups, these nondeferrable items may 
constitute 70 per cent or more of the worker's income. 38 Here, the 
problem emerges as to what level benefit payments can rise before they 
discourage or destroy the incentive to work. 
Coyerage.--unemployment insurance, if it is to fully accomplish its 
purpose, must provide benefits to every worker "who is normally attached 
to the labor force, who has a basic and continuing interest in employment, 
and who is subject to the risk of unemployment. 1139 Only persons who, due 
to administrative or other reasons, are difficult to cover can "legiti-
mately" be excluded from the program. The most likely areas for future 
expansion of coverage exist among employers with less than four employees, 
State and local government employees, and workers for non-profit organiza-
tions and large farms who show substantial attachment to the labor force • 
.s.ta..te Autonomy. --Within the loose framework of the Federal law, 
States are allowed a large amount of discretion in the administration of 
their laws. Originally, the Federalization of unemployment compensation 
38Bureau of Employment Security, Unemployment Insurance: Purpases 
____ , p. 255. 
39Ibid., p. 2. 
25 
was not "pushed" as a result of the fears that a Federal system would be 
declared unconstitutional. However, decisions of the Supreme Court since 
the inception of the Social Security Act have removed the constitutional 
question. This leaves the advocates of nationalization a clear area for 
action. In the meantime, however, we continue to retain a system of un-
employment insurance administered largely by individual States. Moreover, 
any proposed infringement on the rights of States to administer and finance 
their own programs brings into play powerful, opposing forces. 
Experience RatioQ.--Money inflows to State unemployment trust funds 
come from taxes levied on covered State employers. These taxes vary 
from employer to employer, depending on the particular employer's past 
experience in stabilizing his employment. A higher tax rate is assigned 
to employers with a poor record of employment stabilization whereas em-
ployers maintaining a good record are "rewarded" with a low tax rate. 
The original purpose of this tax arrangement was to encourage 
employment stabilization. An employer with stable employment could re-
duce his costs of production. Whether experience rating succeeds in 
this respect is still a matter that is widely argued. Nevertheless, 
experience rating has become a part of the system and will likely remain 
intact in the future. 
CHAPTER III 
BENEFIT DURATION 
Before proceeding to the specific measures extending unemployment 
benefits beyond those provided by State laws, a brief discussion of State 
benefit duration provisions is now in order. Following this discussion , 
general principles relating to benefit duration will be covered. These 
two aspects of benefit duration should provide the necessary background 
for a more detailed discussion of the measures to temporarily extend 
benefits during recessionary periods. 
State Benefit Duration Provisions 
Early State laws provided that the duration of benefits would be 
based on past weeks of work. The Committee on Economic Security and 
the Social Security Board "suggested 1 week of benefits for each 4 weeks 
of work within 2 years up to a maximum of 12 to 16 weeks in a 1 year 
period." In addition, "with the smaller figure /i.2 weeki/, extended 
benefits in the ratio of 1 week of benefits to each 20 uncharged weeks 
of work within 5 years were recommended (subject to a maximum limitation) 
and were provided in some States." 1 States adopting these resolutions 
later repealed them for basically two reasonsg (1) The extension of 
1 Bureau of Employment Security , Employment Security Review, 
(August, 1955), p. 36. 
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benefits would not become effective for a period of years and, (2) long, 
overlapping base periods were difficult to administrate. The repeal pro-
cess continued over a period of years until 1951 when the last two-year 
base period was eliminated. 2 
States, at the present time, 3 have two major types of benefit 
duration provisions--uniform potential duration and variable duration. 
Uniform potential duration is provided in 12 States while 40 States 
prefer a variable duration arrangement.4 
Uniform potential duration laws simply provide for benefits to be 
drawn for a specified length of time. Potential benefits allowable to 
any one person are equal to his computed weekly benefit amount multiplied 
by the duration specified by the State. Duration of benefits ranges from 
12 weeks in Puerto Rico to 30 weeks in Pennsylvania. Eight of the 12 
States provide for 26 weeks of benefits, one State specifies 24 weeks, 
and one State provides for 22 weeks. 
Variable duration is similar to uniform duration in that the maximum 
potential duration of benefits in a benefit year is equal to a multiple 
of the weekly benefit amount. However, a restriction is placed on dura-
tion by placing a limit on benefits paid--a restriction equal to either 
a fraction of base-period wages, a weighted fraction of base-period 
wages, or a fraction of weeks worked in the base period. Twenty-eight 
States limit benefits paid to a fraction of base-period earnings. The 
various percentages are shown in Table 4. In 16 of the 28 States, 
2Ibid. 
3As of January 1, 1962. 
4Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia are included as States. 
Per Cent 
100 
60 
50 
40 
37 
Table 4 
PERCENTAGE OF BASE-PERIOD EARNINGS LIMITATION 
ON DURATION OF BENEFITS BY NUMBER OF STATES 
Number of Per Cent Number of States States 
1 36 1 
1 33 16 
2 30 1 
1 27 1 
1 25 3 
Source: u. s., Bureau of Employment Security, Comparison .o.i State 
llnempJowuent Insurance .LaJOL.s. as. .o.i ,January l, .l.9.62, p. 71. 
benefits paid during the benefit year cannot exceed 1/3 of the base-
28 
period wages. Other percentages vary from 100 per cent to 25 per cent. 
In five States a weighted fraction is used to compute the benefit 
ceiling. Also, in five States, benefits cannot be paid longer than 
some fraction of the weeks of employment in the base period. 
Considering both types of duration provisions (uniform and 
variable), maximum benefit duration ranges from a low of 12 weeks in 
Puerto Rico to a high of 39 weeks in Oklahoma. The modal period is 
26 weeks with 37 States having maximum duration for this length of time. 
Table 5 shows the distribution of States with respect to maximum weeks 
of benefits. Notice that six States still have a maximum of less than 
26 weeks. 
Needless to say, many benefit recipients are not eligible to draw 
benefits for the maximum number of weeks. In general, workers with 
Maximum Weeks 
Benefits 
12.0 
20.0 
22.0 
24.0 
26.0 
28.0 
Table 5 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF STATES 
BY MAXIMUM WEEKS OF BENEFITS, 1962 
of Number of Maximum Weeks 
States Benefits 
1 30.0 
1 32.5 
2 34.0 
2 36.0 
37 39.0 
1 
of Number of 
States 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Source: U.S., Bureau of Employment Security, Gamparisao .a.f State 
J1oempJ ayooeot losura nee Law.s. a.s. .a.f ,January .l, rn, p. 74. 
substantial attachment to the labor force, and, therefore, relatively 
greater base period earnings, will be eligible for benefits paid over 
29 
a longer period of time. On the other hand, workers with sporadic em-
ployment, workers in low-wage industries, and other, similar workers 
will find that their benefit duration is limited by low base-period 
earnings. 
Table 6 shows, on a national basis, both average potential dura-
tion and average actual duration of unemployment insurance claimants 
for the years, 1946-61. A general increase in the average potential 
duration of claimants will be noticed since 1946. This increase is 
largely due to more liberal duration provisions in State laws and, to a 
certain extent, increases in wage rates over a period of years. 
Year 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
Source: 
Table 6 
AVERAGE BENEFIT DURATION IN WEEKS OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE CLAIMANTS, 
UNITED STATES AVERAGE, 1946-61 
Average Average Average 
Potential Actual Year Potential 
Duration Duration Duration 
19.8 13.4 1954 22.4 
19.5 11.1 1955 22.7 
21.1 10.7 1956 23.0 
21.4 11.8 1957 23.4 
21.1 13.0 1958 23.5 
22.4 10.1 1959 23.6 
22.0 10.4 1960 24.0 
22.1 10.1 1961 23.9 
Compiled from, U.S., Bureau of Employment Security, 
JJaewpJcymeat Jasvraace FiaaaciaJ D.a.:ta., 1938-61. 
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Average 
Actual 
Duration 
12.8 
12.4 
11.4 
11.6 
14.8 
13.1 
12.7 
14.7 
l:laadbcc~ .ai 
Average actual duration measures the number of weeks of employment for 
which the worker receives benefits during the year. This figure will be 
considerably below the potential duration figure as many benefit recip-
ients find employment before their benefits expire. In recessionary 
periods, however, the length of time a person is unemployed tends to in-
crease. This increase, of course, is reflected in the average actual 
duration figure. 
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Extension of Benefits and the Unemployment Insurance Concept 
How long should benefits be paid? At what point does the benefit 
become a dole or relief payment? Does the extension of benefit duration 
violate the insurance principle? These, and other questions arise when 
benefit duration is discussed. Although these questions do not and 
cannot have specific answers, some attempt must be made to answer them. 
The Bureau of Employment Security is of the opinion that "the dura-
tion of benefits should be sufficient to enable the great majority of 
insured workers to find suitable work before exhausting their benefit 
rights, under nonnal or recession conditions. 115 They go on to state 
that "no more than 25 per cent of the beneficiaries ,Cs'houl.d,7 exhaust 
benefits under nonnal or recession conditions.n6 We will see in Chapter 
IV that in four of the six years from 1956 through 1961, the exhaustion 
rate exceeded 25 per cent. 
These high exhaustion rates imply that State benefit duration provi-
sions have not been adequate to deal with the length of unemployment 
experienced in four of the six years just mentioned. However, the exten-
sion of benefits raises some vital questions. The main argument is that 
benefit duration, in accordance with the insurance principle, should only 
be for short periods of time and should be in some ratio to past earnings 
and, therefore, contributions. Burns questions this argument: 
Once, however it is granted that unemployment insurance is a social 
insurance rather than an ordinary insurance program, it is clear that 
the selection of appropriate duration periods must be detennined by 
5Bureau of Employment Security, Unemployment Insurance: Pqrpases 
__.__..., P• 7. 
broader economic and social considerations and in particular by t he 
function which the community desires the ~rogram to fulfill, and t his 
fact has been recognized by many systems. 
32 
Social insurance programs are, she explains, different in many ways from 
private insuranceo She points out that: 
The usual social insurance formula today weights the payment in favor of 
the lower- paid worker, and the programs usually provide a minimum benefit 
and very frequently also additional payments for persons dependent on the 
beneficiary, although no differential contribution is charged against 
workers with family responsibilities.a 
Moreover, unemployment insurance "depart{/ from strict insurance 
principles in regard to duration of benefits. 119 Some States provide for 
uniform "benefit duration for all eligible workers or, where the ratio 
rule is retained, specify a statutory minimum duration ••• 1110 
Burns also discusses other ways in which social insurance differs 
from private insurance. Briefly, social insurance: (1) is compulsory 
whereas private insurance is not, (2) provides for little or no classifi-
cation of insured groups into groups having similar risks, (3) does not 
cost individual groups as much proportionally as the risks incurred by 
these groups, (4) is not an irrmutable contract between a corporation and 
an individual, but a social contract that is changed by legislation, and 
(5) ptovides for upward revisions in compensation in light of cost of 
living increases. 11 
7Evaline Burns, Socia) Securit:y a.o.d Public Pa)icy (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1956), p. 113. 
8Ibid., P• 31. 
9Ibid. 
lOibid. 
llrbid., PP· 32, 34. 
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Whether social insurance is or is not "insurance" depends on the 
definition we apply to the word. In any case, she concludes, we should 
not let a strict definition of insurance blind us to the greater social 
and economic problems to be attacked by our social insurance program. 
Becker also believes that different principles are applicable to un-
employment insurance, depending on whether we are in a period of normal 
unemployment or in a period of rising or high unemployment. In normal 
periods we could and should rely on the competitive concept--one that 
emphasizes individual responsibility for the payment of benefits. He 
believes tha ti 
In periods of normal unemployment, the characteristics of the regular 
program make good sense on both the tax and benefit sides. In such 
periods the individual States are generally able to finance their own 
programs and do not need outside help ••• Employers ••• generally 
are able to pay the variable taxes imposed by experience rating ••• 
In such periods, also, practically all the regular members of the 
labor force will have a record of substantial work in at least one of 
the four quarters of the preceding year and hence will qualify for 
unemployment benefits ••• During periods of high employment relatively 
few of the regular members of the labor forr2 will need much more than 
26 weeks in which to find another job ••• 
However, during periods of abnormal unemployment, Becker tends to 
lean more toward the welfare concept--the concept of collective respon-
sibility and action~ 
In situations of abnormal unemployment, however, these same 
characteristics of the regular program make less sense ••• An 
extension of benefits sufficient to meet the needs of all abnormal 
situations ••• would make it very difficult ••• to retain ••• 
State responsibility and experience rating. A few States and many 
12Rev. Joseph M. Becker, "Unemployment Benefits in Periods of Normal 
and Abnormal Employment," U. s., Congress, House, Corruni ttee on Ways and 
Means, Hea ri DQ5, .wl .:the Subject sif. Proposed Amendments .:t.a. .:the Fed era 1 
Law.s. .o.o Jloemploymeot Cawpeosati ao, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, p. 552. 
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individual employers would find the burden of adequate benefits too great 
in abnormal periods. In such periods, the burden ought to be shared more 
widely; the competitive emphasis ought to yield to the welfare emphasis.13 
Becker goes on to say that the feasible approach would be to supple-
ment the existing program of unemployment insurance. Some students of 
unemployment insurance would not go as far as Becker in his suggestion 
that the extension of benefits be accompanied with liberalized qualifica-
tion requirements. Others, however, would change the program even more 
radically. For instance, Professor Galbraith would propose "Cyclically 
Graduated Compensation" whereby benefit amounts would increase as unem-
ployment increases and decline as full employment is approached. 14 
Employer groups, as we shall see in Chapter V, include in their arguments 
the charge that changes such as Becker and Galbraith propose would tend 
to reduce unemployment insurance to a welfare or relief program. However, 
an analysis such as that presented by Becker relies strongly on the 
argument, as Evaline Burns did, that other considerations may override 
the strictly defined insurance concept. 
With these facts in mind, we will examine in the next chapter the 
1958 and 1961 acts dealing with extension of benefit payments during the 
recessions of 1957-58 and 1960-61. 
l3Ibid., p. 553. 
14John Kenneth Galbraith, Iha Affluent 5oc1ety (Bostons Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1958), Chapter 12. Professor Galbraith would retain the 
present State programs and let the basic unemployment benefit be paid under 
these programs. However, the supplement would be paid by the Federal Gov-
ernment, This supplement "•would take the form of a specified fraction of 
the difference between the worker's weekly earnings over a period in his 
last employment and his entitlement under established unemployment compen-
sation."' As unemployment would reach higher and higher levels, the frac-
tion would also increase. When relatively large numbers of people become 
unemployed, total benefit amounts would approach the unemployed person's 
"normal" wages. Of course, as unemployment declined, benefit amounts 
would also decline. 
CHAPTER IV 
PROGRAMS TO EXIEND BENEFIT DURATION 
Evaline Burns points out that '0much more important in influencing 
decisions as to duration of unemployment benefits has been (and is likely 
to be) the incidence and severity of the risk of unemployment. 10 1 In 
times of prosperity or the upswing of the business cycle, little agita-
tion is noticed for programs to alleviate the plight of the worker who 
has exhausted his benefits. On the other hand, when unemployment is 
rising, and, consequently, the exhaustion rate, more interest is taken 
in the problem. We have already noted the same general type of action--
that of expediency--in connection with the passage of the Social Securi ty 
Act of 1935. 
Such was the case in 1958 and 1961. The recessions of these years 
caused unemployment and the exhaustion rate to reach much higher levels 
than under normal conditions. The Temporary Unemployment Compensation 
Act of 1958 and the Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 
1961 were measures to alleviate the immediate problem of large numbers 
of persons exhausting benefit payments. 
Ernest J. Eberling has the following comment about the recent de-
velopments in extension of benefitsg 
13urns, Social Security -......-, p. 113. 
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It is not difficult to understand why the UI system has been subjected 
recently to increasing pressure to make provision for extended duration 
periods. Repeated recessions with higher rates of unemployment following 
each one, the existence of many distressed areas, the threat to jobs 
caused by automation, and the persistence and increase of long-tenn 
unemployment account largely for this development. 2 
The discussion for the remainder of the chapter will deal with the 
economic factors giving rise to the two temporary measures, the principle 
features and results of the measures, and a sumnary of their comparative 
effectiveness. 
The Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act of 1958 
( Public Law 85-441) 
Ib.e Recession .a.£ 1957-58.--The Temporary Unemployment Compensation 
Act of 1958 was a result of the sharp increase in unemployment in Decem-
ber, 1957 and the subsequent increase in exhaustion rates as unemployment 
increased. Table 7 shows the monthly rate of insured unemployment for 
the period from January, 1957 through December, 1959. The insured unem-
ployment rate increased from 3.6 per cent in November, 1957 to 5.1 per 
cent in December of the same year. A steady increase in unemployment 
through the early part of 1958 reached its peak in March and April at a 
rate of 7.9 per cent. It was not until May, 1959 that the rate of in-
sured unemployment dropped below 4o0 per cent. 
The rise in unemployment is, of course, accompanied by an increase 
in initial claims for unemployment benefits. Lagging behind these two 
indicators is the number of people exhausting benefit rights. 
2Ernest J. Eberling, "Extension of Benefit Payments," U.S., 
Bureau of Employment Security, Empla)OJ)eot $eC)lrjty Revj ew, XXIX 
(December, 1962), p. 12. 
Table 7 
INSURED UNEMPLOYMENT AS A PER CENT OF COVERED EMPLOYMENT 
UNDER ST ATE PROGRAMS, BY MONTHS, 1957-59 
Month Ba±e Month Ba±e 
1957 1958 1959 1957 1958 
January 4.4 6.9 6.0 July 3.1 6.0 
February 4.3 7.6 5.7 August 2.8 5.2 
March 4.0 7.9 5.0 September 2.8 4.5 
April 3.6 7.9 4o4 October 3.0 4.1 
May 3.3 7.1 3.6 November 3.6 4.3 
June 3.0 6.3 3.3 December 5.1 5.1 
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1959 
3.5 
3.4 
3.1 
3.4 
4.4 
4.7 
Source: Compiled from, U.S., Council of Economic Advisors, Economic 
Indicators, January, 1958; January, 1959; and January, 1960. 
Table 8 illustrates a number of the more pertinent indicators of the 
problem. The weekly average of initial claims increased from 268,000 
in 1957 to 370,000 in 1958, an increase of over 38 per cent. During the 
same period, the weekly average of benefit exhaustions jumped from 23,000 
to 50,000, an increase of 117 per cent. 
In the previous chapter, the Bureau of Employment Security was 
quoted as saying that no more than 25 per cent of initial claimants 
should exhaust beneTit rights under an effective program of unemployment 
insurance. This rate was exceeded by six per cent in 1958 and remained 
above 25 per cent from 1958 through 1961. 
Also, average actual duration closely follows the fluctuations in 
the rate of insured unemployment. An increase of 3.2 weeks over the 1957 
Year 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
Table 8 
SELECTED UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE DATA, 1956-61 
Weekly Average, Thousands 
Initial 
Claims 
226 
268 
370 
281 
331 
350 
Exhaustions 
20 
23 
50 
33 
31 
46 
Per Cent of 
Claimants 
Drawing 
First Payments 
That Exhausted 
Benefits 
21.5 
22.7 
31.0 
29.6 
26.1 
30.4 
Insured Un-
employment 
as a Per Cent 
of Covered 
Employment 
3.2 
3.6 
6.4 
4.4 
4.8 
5.6 
Qm:ati on of BeneU ts 
Average Average 
Actual Actual for 
Exhaustees 
11.4 20.0 
11.6 20.5 
14.8 21.7 
13.1 21. 7 
12.7 21.4 
14.7 21.8 
Source: Compiled from, u.s., Bureau of the Budget, m Supplement .t.o. Economic Indicators and u.s., 
Bureau of Employment Security, Handbook cl. JJnemployment Insurance floancjal Da.ta., 1938-61. 
w 
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average actual duration figure is noted for 1958. We might expect the 
average duration to increase during periods of high employment since more 
people are expected to draw the maximum amount of benefits. 
Long-term unemployment also increased in 1958. In 1957, 8.1 per 
cent of the unemployed were out of work 27 weeks or more. However, in 
1958, the rate increased to 14.2 per cent, a gain of over 75 per cent. 3 
In light of the downturn in business activity, President Eisenhower 
transmitted a message to the Congress on March 25, 1958 recommending 
legislation for the purpose of temporarily extending benefits to eligible 
persons who had exhausted their benefits under State and Federal laws.4 
The result of this message was the passage of Public Law 85-441--the 
Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act of 1958. 
Proyi5ions. 2-on June 4, 1958, President Eisenhower signed into law 
the Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act of 1958. As a result, 15 
days after the signing of the law, workers who had exhausted benefits 
under State unemployment insurance programs became eligible to draw addi-
tional, temporary unemployment benefits. The act provided for retroactive 
payments to persons exhausting benefits as far back as June 30, 1957, or, 
a later date if a participating State so desired. Benefits were paid for 
3Richard A. Lester, "Is Unemployment Insurance Geared to Today's 
Unemployment Risks?," Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, 
Proceedings .ai.. .:th.e Fourth Annua 1 Socia 1 security Conference (Ka lama zoo, 
Michigan, 1962), p. 115. 
4u.s., Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, Hearings, .c.n H...B.... 
~' Ao Ad. io. Provide fw::. Temporary Additional JJnemployment Compensa -
.iio.o, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, p. 86. 
5Unless otherwise noted, provisions are taken from: u. s., Congress, 
Public .Lalo!. 85-441, 85th Cong., 1958. 
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weeks of unemployment starting with the date the State officially agreed 
to participate in the program until the expiration date of the TUC law--
April 1, 1959. Later, in March 1959, Congress extended the expiration 
date to July 1, 1959 so that workers who had established a claim before 
April 1, 1959 could continue to receive benefits.6 Therefore, benefits 
were paid under the program from June 19, 1958 through June 30, 1959, a 
period of just over one year. 
The benefit recipient was eligible to receive additional weekly 
benefits equal to 50 per cent of his basic entitlement allowed by the 
State law under which he last exhausted benefit rights. Also, the weekly 
benefit amount was equal to the benefit amount allowed by the State pro-
gram under which the benefit recipient last exhausted benefit rights. 
In other words, exhaustees were eligible for a 50 per cent extension of 
regular benefit payments. The unemployment compensation otherwise payable 
to an individual under State law could not be denied or reduced as a re-
sult of the individual's eligibility for temporary extended payments. 
If benefits were denied, the person's right to a hearing was the same as 
provided for in the Social Security Act. 
The Federal act did not compel any State to join the program. Parti-
cipation in the program was completely voluntary. States could participate 
either fully or partially with respect to State and Federal (UCFE, UCV, 
7 UCX) programs. One, all, or any combination of the programs could be 
6April l was the tennination date if the State paid benefits on the 
basis of flexible weeks, April 5 if benefits were paid on the basis of 
calendar weeks, and April 7 if benefits were paid on the basis of payroll 
weeks. 
7ucFE: Federal civilian employees; UCV: Korea veterans; UCX: Ex-
servicemen. 
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elected on the part of the participating State. 
The extension of benefits was financed out of advances made by the 
Federal Goverrunent to State unemployment accounts. These advances were , 
however, considered as loans rather than grants. Each State will ulti-
mately pay not only the cost of extra benefits granted to that State's 
exhaustees, but will also pay a proportionate share of the administrative 
costs connected with the TUC program. The procedure for repaying the 
advances is outlined under Title XII of the Social Security Acto If re-
payment has not been accomplished by January 1, 1963, a reduction in the 
90 per cent credit allowed against the Federal unemployment tax goes into 
effect.8 This reduction is, of course, to insure repayment of the advanceo 
BespJts.--The TUC program went into effect on June 19, 1958. At this 
time, "unemployment totaled about 5.4 million" /;.ni'/ "only about half of 
these people were receiving unemployment benefits, including those under 
the railroad insurance program. 119 Since the act did provide benefits to 
persons who exhausted benefits as far back as June 30, 1957, a large back-
log of initial claims for extended benefits existed. "During June and 
July of 1958, nearly 1 million initial claims were filed under the t em-
porary programs ••• nlO Out of a total of 2,465,715 claims fil ed under 
all programs for the duration of the act, over 40 per cent were fil ed 
during the first one and one-half months. 
8 As of January 1, 1963, none of the States had repaid with the ex-
ception of the District of Columbiao 
9u .s., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Heari o'-s, 
Temporary JioempJ ayment Campensati ao aD.d Aid .iJl Dependent Chi J dren .o.f 
JioempJayed Parents, 87th Congo, 1st Sess., 1961, p. 77. 
lOibid. 
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Since the TUC Act was of a voluntary nature, all States did not elect 
to pay extended benefits. A total of 17 States participated in all pro-
grams (regular State programs, UCFE, UCX, and UCV) while 12 States chose 
to pay benefits only under the regular Federal programs. In addition, 
five States enacted temporary extended duration programs "for exhaustees 
under their State programs, which resulted in extended duration for their 
UCFE and later their UCX exhaustees."ll However, they participated only 
for UCV exhaustees under the TUC Act. 12 Therefore, 34 States paid extended 
benefits under various programs during the 1957-58 recession. Partial 
participation existed in 12 States and 22 States participated fullyo Bene-
fits of various kinds were paid in 29 States directly as a result of the 
TUC Act. States participating in the various programs are listed in Table 9. 
Although all States did not participate in the TUC program, a large 
proportion of covered workers under regular unemployment insurance programs 
were eligible for extended benefits. The 17 States that participated 
fully in the TUC program and the five States with independent programs 
"accounted for about 70 per cent of all covered workers and also of all 
exhaustees to whom these programs were directed. 1113 The large proportion 
results from the fact that the large industrial States elected to partici-
pate under the TUC Act. 14 
11u. s., Bureau of Employment Security, Ih.e. .I..a.b.cz Market a.llii Employ-
m.en:t. Security, (September, 1959), p. 38. All States except Colorado ex-
tended benefits by 50 per cent. Additional benefits in Colorado were 
limited to no more than 25 per cent of past benefits. 
12Bureau of Employment Security, Ih..e. I..a..l:loJ:: Market a.llii Employment 
Security, (September, 1959), p. 38. 
13House Committee on Ways and Means, Temporary IJnemp)oyment Compen-
sation Hearings, 1961, p. 76. 
14Ibid., p. 77. 
Table 9 
ST ATES PARTICIPATING IN TEMPORARY 
PROGRAMS, 1958-59 
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~ Partjcjpatjpg states; Pa rt i a l l y Pa rti ci pat i og Stat es : 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arkansas 
California 
Delaware 
District of Columbia 
Indiana 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Nevada 
New Jersey 
New York 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
West Virginia 
Arizona 
Florida 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Kentucky 
Nebraska 
New Mexico 
North Dakota 
Oregon 
South Carolina 
Texas 
Washington 
states lOl.i.tb. Jociepeocieot Programs: 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Illinois 
Ohio 
Wisconsin 
Source; Compiled from, U. s., Bureau of Employment Security, I.b.e tabor 
Market ari.d Fmp1oymeot Security, August, 1959, p. 81; and House 
Committee on Ways and Means, Temporary IIoempJ oymeot Compeosatjop 
Hearings, 1961, p. 83. 
Table 10 sunmarizes the results of the various programs under the 
TUC Act. Over 2.4 million initial claims were filed under all programs 
before the TUC program expired. The 12 partially participating States 
and the five States with separate programs comprised a relatively minor 
part of the total while the 17 fully participating States accounted for 
the large remainder. Since, in all categories, a majority of the activity 
occurred in the fully participating States, the discussion will center 
around the data describing the total of all programs. The reader can keep 
Table 10 
SELECTED DATA ON THE TEMPORARY PROGR/\MS, JUNE, 1958 TO JULY, 1959 
Program 
Total, All 
Programs 
Total, TUC 
Program 
Total, 12 
Partially 
Participating 
States 
Total, 17 
Fully Partici-
Ini tia 1 
Claims 
2,465,715 
1,973,216 
80,879 
pating States 1,892,337 
Total, TED 
Programs 
(5 States) 492,499 
First 
Payments 
2,013,349 
1,574,022 
28,280 
1,545,742 
439,327 
Final 
Payments 
(Exhaustions) 
1,203,308 
940,782 
18,677 
922,105 
262,526 
Total 
Benefits 
Paid 
$600,706,000 
473,544,000 
7,766,000 
465,778,000 
127,162,000 
Average 
Weekly 
Benefit 
Amount 
$30.44 
30.41 
30.48 
30.54 
Average 
Duration 
(Weeks) 
9.8 
9.9 
9.9 
9.5 
Total 
Weeks 
Compen-
sated 
19,736,779 
15,573,439 
292,800 
15,280,639 
4,163,340 
Source; Compiled from, U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, HearioQs, Temporary .lluem-
pl owneot Cpmpeosati oo a..o.d. Aid. .to. Dependent Chj J dreo .oi. l/oempJ oyed Fa rents, 87th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 1961, Appendix A, Table 1, p. 82. Total Weeks Compensated computed from U.S., Bureau 
of Fmployment Security, I.he I,abpr Market a..o.d. EmpJownent Security, September, 1959, p. 62. 
.i:,,. 
.i:,,. 
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in mind that a large proportion of the total is due to the 17 States just 
described. 
A large number of final payments indicates that many recipients ex-
hausted their rights to extended benefits. In fact, if the number of 
exhaustions is divided by the number of first payments, we find that 
nearly 60 per cent of the recipients exhausted their extended benefits. 
The average duration of benefits drawn under the TUC program was 9.8 
weeks. Since the average weekly benefit amount was $30.44, the average 
recipient received $298.31 in total extended benefits. Over $600.7 
million was paid out in extended benefits over the one-year period. 
During the same period, 2,013,349 recipients were compensated for a total 
of 19,736,779 weeks of unemployment. 
In summary we can say that the TUC program was helpful not only to 
the unemployed during the 1957-58 recession; also, the benefits paid crea-
ted a small amount of new purchasing power within the economy. The total 
benefits paid under the act amounted to only .135 per cent of the 1958 
Gross National Product. However, much of this money flowed initially to 
sectors of the economy that most needed it--the large industrial areas and 
industrial States and then, because of respending , throughout the economy. 
Recipients were those people who, because of their particular situation, 
were likely to have a high marginal propensity to spend. As a result, it 
is likely that aggregate demand was stimulated slightly by this new in-
jection of purchasing power. 
The timing of the act was also important. The TUC Act became effec-
tive on June 19, 1958 at the end of the second quarter of that year. 
Benefit exhaustions for that quarter totaled 721,972. The number of 
exhaustions climbed to 777,912 during the third quarter of 1958--the highest 
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number of exhaustions of any quarter during the period from the middle of 
1957 through the first half of 1959. 15 From the above data, we can see 
that the Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act of 1958 became effective 
just as exhaustions under regular unemployment programs reached their peako 
Temporary Extended Benefitsa State Laws 
The TUC Act expired June 30, 1959. However, during 1959 several 
States liberalized their duration provisions while six States provided 
for automatic extension of benefits during periods of high unemployment. 
Maximum duration provisions were liberalized in 16 States, excluding 
the six States enacting extension of benefit provisionso In all except 
two States, the new maximum was at least 26 weeks. In six States, maxi-
mum duration was set at 30 weeks or above. Oklahoma was the only State 
to provide a maximum duration of 39 weeks. 16 
California, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, North Carolina, and Vermont 
now provide for an extension of benefits when unemployment within the 
State reaches a specified level. North Carolina provides for a uniform 
duration of 26 weeks and extends benefits for eight weeks during periods 
of high unemployment. The other uniform duration State, Vermont, allows 
26 weeks of benefits with an extension of 13 weeks. California, Connecticut, 
Idaho, and Illinois have variable duration provisions allowing a potential 
maximum duration of 26 weeks with a potential extension of 13 weeks. In 
other words, benefits are extended 50 per cent when the program is triggered 
15 
Ibid., p. 76. 
16Ibid., Po 81. 
. 17 into operation. 
The Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1961 
(Public Law 87-6) 
Ih.e Recession .a.f J96Q-6J.--The recessions of 1957-58 and 1960-61 
occurred almost back to back. Table 11 shows the rate of insured 
Table 11 
INSURED UNEMPLOYMENT AS A PER CENT OF COVERED EMPLOYMENT 
UNDER ST ATE PROGRAMS, BY MONTHS, 1958-60 
Month Rate Month Rate 
1958 1959 1960 1958 1959 1960 
January 6.9 6.0 5.6 July 6.0 3.5 4.3 
February 7.6 5.7 5.5 August 5.2 3.4 4.2 
March 7.9 5.0 5.7 September 4.5 3.1 4.0 
April 7.9 4.4 4.9 October 4.1 3.4 4.2 
May 7.1 3.6 4.3 November 4.3 4.4 5.1 
June 6.3 3.3 4.0 December 5.1 4.7 6.6 
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Source: u.s., Council of Economic Advisors, Economic I oci j i:.a :t o;cs , March, 
1959; January, 1960; and February, 1961. 
unemployment under State programs by month for the period from January, 
1959 through December, 1960. The rate of insured unemployment remained 
above 4.0 per cent during 1958 and did not drop below 4.0 per cent until 
May, 1959. The rate of less than 4.0 per cent lasted only six months and, 
again, in November, 1959, exceeded 4.0 per cent. Insured unemployment 
17 Bureau of Employment Security, Compa;cisoo .a.f State..........___.., p. 80. 
remained above 4o0 per cent of the covered labor force until September, 
1961. Only six months in the two-year period from January, 1959 through 
December, 1960 showed an unemployment rate of less than 5.0 per cent. The 
lowest rate recorded in 1960 was 4.0 per cent in June and September. 
We can come to the conclusion that there is no clear dividing line 
between the two recessions. Both 1959 and 1960 show relatively high unem-
ployment rates for the first four and the last two months of the year while 
unemployment seasonally declines during the surrmer and early autumn months. 
The impetus for the TEUC Act of 1961 was provided by the abnormally 
high monthly unemployment rates starting in November, 1960 and continuing 
through the early part of 19610 By February, 1961, 804 per cent of the 
covered labor force was unemployed. Table 12 shows selected unemployment 
insurance data for the fourteen-month period from August, 1960 through 
September, 1961. Insured unemployment increased steadily starting in 
September, 1960 and reached a maximum in February, 1961. Initial claims, 
following the same trend, reached a maximum in January, 1961. Benefit ex-
haustions, lagging behind the insured unemployment rate, started moving 
upward in September, 1960 and reached a maximum in April of the following 
yearo The average actual duration of benefits increased from 12.7 weeks 
in 1960 to 14.7 weeks in 1961. 18 At the same time, 30.4 per cent of the 
claimants drawing first benefits in 1961 exhausted these benefits as 
opposed to 26.1 per cent exhausting in 1960. 19 
In response to the growing volume of exhaustions, Congress passed the 
Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1961. President Kennedy 
18see Table 8. 
19Ibid. 
Period 
1960g 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
1961: 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
Table 12 
SELECTED UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE DATA 
AUGUST, 1960-SEPTEMBER, 1961 
State Programs 
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Wee~ l ~ 8~ei:a g e, Ibcu sa cd s Insured Unemployment Insured Initial 
Unemployment Claims Exhaustions as a Per Cent of Covered Employment 
1657 306 28 4o2 
1598 274 27 4o0 
1678 332 29 4.2 
2039 396 31 5.1 
2639 494 36 6.6 
3266 541 44 8.1 
3394 480 49 8.4 
3168 372 53 7.8 
2779 367 58 6.8 
2328 297 54 5o7 
1991 279 53 4.9 
1958 357 50 4.8 
1744 271 44 4.3 
1558 260 38 3.8 
Sources U.S., Council of Economic Advisors, Eccccmic Icdicatci:s, October, 
1961. 
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signed the bill into law on March 24, 1961. 
. . 20 Prov151on5.--The TEUC Act became effective on April 8, 1961, 15 days 
after the bill was signed into law. An insured person exhausting unemploy-
ment benefits was entitled to extended benefits equal to 50 per cent of t he 
basic entitlement allowed by the State law under which benefit r i ghts were 
last exhausted. The weekly benefit amount was the same as that provided 
under the State law. However, no person could receive extended benefits 
longer than 13 weeks. In addition, no recipient could draw more than 39 
times the weekly benefit amount in a continuous compensation period when 
both regular and extended benefits were considered. If a claimant received 
weekly payments from a retirement pension or annuity under a public or pri-
vate retirement plan contributed to by any base-period employer, the weekly 
benefit amount drawn under TEUC could be reduced by the amount received. 
Although the TEUC bill took effect on April 8, 1961, workers exhausting 
benefits as far back as June 30, 1960 were eligible for extended benefits. 
Benefits were paid until June 30, 1962 for valid claims filed before March 
31, 1962. Weeks of unemployment beyond March 31, 1962 were not compensable 
under the TEUC Act. 
The TEUC Act, unlike the TUC Act of 1958, was financed by the Federal 
Government. States were reimbursed for extended benefits up to 13 weeks 
paid to eligible claimants under the act. In States that paid regular 
benefits longer than 26 weeks, the Federal Government would compensate 
the State for the difference between the regular duration and 26 weeks 
plus the amount necessary to extend the total compensation period to 39 
20unless otherwise noted, prov1s1ons are taken frorni U.S., Congress, 
Public lalOI. .8.1=.o, 87th Cong., 1961. 
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weeks. In other words, States with provisions allowing more than 26 weeks 
of regular benefits were not penalized. They were still reimbursed for 
13 weeks of extended benefit payments. 
Administrative costs of the program were also absorbed by the Federa l 
Government. The costs incurred by each State in connection with the TEUC 
program were handled as conventional unemployment insurance administrative 
costs. The Federal Government reimburses the States for administrative 
expenses as provided under Title III of the Social Security Act. 
Technically, an account was established in the unemployment trust fund 
known as the Federal extended compensation account. Treasury revenues 
were transferred to this account for the purpose of reimbursing States for 
payments to exhaustees under the TEUC Act. The Treasury will be reimbursed 
through an increase in the Federal unemployment tax from 0.4 per cent to 
0.8 per cent. The increased tax rate is effective for the calendar years 
of 1962 and 1963. 
As a result of the increase in the Federal unemployment tax, all 
States were "forced" to join the TEUC program. Employers in all States 
were subject to the increased tax. Therefore, employers in a State not 
entering into an agreement with the Federal Government would be paying 
for extended benefits while workers within the State would not be eligible 
for the extension. 
Since all States (including Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, 
and the Virgin Islands) participated in the TEUC program, 100 per cent 
coverage of insured workers was accomplished. Extended benefits were 
paid to employees covered by both State and Federal laws. Also, provision 
was made in the act for the collection of statistics, on a sample basis, 
pertaining to the characteristics of the TEUC claimants. 
Comparison of the Provisions and Results of the 
TUC Act of 1958 and the TEUC "Act of 1961 
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Benefits were paid under the TUC Act from June 19, 1958 to July 1, 
1959, a period of 12 1/3 months. The TEUC Act provided for benefits to 
be drawn between April 8, 1961 and June 30, 1962, a period of 14 2/3 
months. Therefore, if we confine our comparison to the length of time 
benefits were paid under the two acts, the TEUC Act paid out benefits 
approximately 2 1/3 months longer then the 1958 act. However, both acts 
provided payments to workers exhausting benefits before the acts became 
effective. In the case of the TUC Act, this backlog period was about 
11 2/3 months. In the case of the TEUC Act, the backlog period was 
9 1/4 months. When the backlog period is added to the actual benefit 
payment period for both acts, we find that this time period is approxi-
mately 24 months for both acts. 
June 30, 1959 and June 30, 1962 were the dates on which benefits 
were stopped for the TUC Act and TEUC Act respectively. But, claimants 
had to file for weeks of unemployment that occurred before April 1 in 
both 1959 and 1961. Therefore, both acts, when the backlog periods are 
considered, allowed compensable exhaustions over a 21 month period. 
Perhaps the widest divergence between the TUC and TEUC Acts was in 
the financing provisions of these acts. Under the TUC Act, States were 
required to finance the additional benefits paid in the State plus the 
cost of administration. Repayment to the Federal Government for advances 
made in connection with the program would be made out of a State's unem-
ployment account in the unemployment trust fund. This repayment would 
be made at the discretion of the Gov ernor of the State concerned. How-
ever, if the advance was not repaid by January 1, 1963, the 90 per cent 
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credit allowed against the Federal tax on the taxable wage base of a 
debtor State would be reduced. In any case, the cost of the program was 
borne by the States and the cost was directly proportional to the unem-
ployment benefits paid to employees within the Stateo 
The TEUC Act provided that the cost of the program would be met on a 
nation-wide rather than on a State-by-State basis. By financing extended 
benefits initially out of general Treasury revenues, and later, out of a 
uniform increase in the Federal unemployment tax on all employers, the 
cost of the program was spread among all the States. The relative merits 
and arguments for both types of financing will be reserved for Chapter V. 
The difference in total coverage of the two acts is evident. Since 
the TUC Act was not compulsory, only 17 States fully participated in the 
program. In addition, 12 States participated partially, paying benefits 
under the UCFE, UCX, and UCV programs and five States enacted temporary 
programs independently of the TUC program. The 17 fully participating 
and the five States with independent programs accounted for about 70 per 
cent of the total number of insured workers in the country. On the other 
hand, if the five States with independent programs are excluded and only 
those States which fully or partially participated in the TUC program are 
counted, we can expect that considerably less than 70 per cent of the in-
sured labor force was technically eligible for extended benefitso 
Because of the greater number of workers eligible for extended 
benefits under the TEUC Act, the total amount of benefits paid out und er 
the 1961 act exceeded the amount paid out under the 1958 act. Tabl e 13 
summarizes the final effects of the TEUC program. Total benefits paid 
under the 1961 program amounted to $769,124,620-- .138 per cent of the 
1962 Gross National Product. This total was $295,580,620 more than the 
Table 13 
SELECTED DATA ON THE TEUC ACT OF 1961 
APRIL 8, 1961--JUNE 30, 1962 
Total Benefits Paido••••••••••••••o•••••••••$769,124,620 
Additional Reimbursement 
to States with Laws Provi-
ding Regular Duration of 
More Than 26 Weeks••••••••••••••••o•••••o••• 48,000,000 
Average Weekly Benefit •••• o•••••••••••••••o• $30.48 
Average Duration of 
Extended Benefitso••••••••o••••••••o•••••••• 9 Weeks 
Total First Payments.0•••••••••000000••••••• 2,763,199 
Total Final Payments••••••••••••o••••••••••• 1,738,076 
Per Cent Exhausting 
Extended Benefitsoo•oo•••••••ooooo••o••••••• 62.9 
Source: U.S., Bureau of Employment Security, Ib.e. .I.a.boJ:: Market a.o.d 
EmpJoyroeot Security, August, 1962, pp. 1, 2, 56. 
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total benefits paid out under the TUC program of 1958. Also, the total 
benefits paid under the 1961 act exceeded the amount of benefits paid 
under all the 1958 programs by $168,418,6200 
Another advantage of the 1961 act was the fact that statistics were 
gathered concerning the characteristics of the TEUC claimants. In a sense, 
the whole case for extension of benefits rests on these characteristics. 
If benefits were paid to large numbers of people who are classified as 
the "hard-core" unemployed, then it becomes questionable as to whether 
these people should be aided through the unemployment insurance program. 
The average weekly benefit amount under both programs was nearly the 
same. The average payment in 1958 was $30041 while an average payment of 
$30.93 per week was drawn under the 1961 programo 
However, the average duration of benefits dropped from 9.9 weeks 
under the TUC Act to 9.0 weeks under the TEUC Act. This decline is due 
largely to the different provisions of the two acts relating to the 
maximum duration that extended benefits could be drawn. There was no 
stipulation as to the maximum number of weeks extended benefits could 
be paid under the 1958 program, whereas a 13 week limitation was placed 
on these benefits under the 1961 act. 
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By multiplying the average duration of benefits by the average 
weekly benefit amount, we find that an average exhaustee received 
$278.37 in total extended benefits under the 1961 program. Therefore, 
the average total payment was almost $20.00 less under the TEUC Act than 
under the TUC Act. 
Almost 63.0 per cent of the TEUC claimants exhausted benefit rights, 
an absolute increase of 3.0 per cent over the 60.0 per cent exhausting 
under the TUC Act. 
CHAPTER V 
THE VIEWS OF SPECIAL INTEREST GiOUPS 
Economic legislation, in any form, will normally stir up controversy. 
Various provisions of any bill commonly are to the advantage of one group 
and to the disadvantage, real or imagined, of another. Additionally, the 
proposed changes may raise questions involving the philosophy behind the 
entire program. Such is the case when the unemployment insurance system 
is subject to modification. 
So that the various groups involved may have a voice in proposed 
legislation, hearings are provided before Congressional committees that 
handle the particular legislation under consideration. Unemployment com-
pensation legislation is handled by the Committee on Ways and Means in 
the House of Representatives and by the Committee on Finance in the 
Senate. The bulk of this chapter will be devoted to the arguments of 
interest groups before the Committee on Ways and Means preceding the 
passage of the Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 19610 
The primary reason for centering the discussion around the 1961 act is 
that arguments preceding both the 1961 and 1958 acts tended to follow 
the same lines of reasoning. 
It is difficult to draw a clear line between the philosophies of 
the different groups described in this and the preceding chapter. How-
ever, one point clearly emerges when the arguments of these groups are 
examined: Employer organizations are generally more conservative in 
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their views than either organized labor or the Department of Labor. 
Evaline Burns explains the employers' particular philosophy in the 
area of experience rating: 
Employers, who in general strongly favor experience-rating, continue 
to maintain that the assessment of costs against employers alone must 
rest in large measure on the theory that unemployment is a responsibility 
of the employer ••• Carried to its logical conclusion, this theory 
opposes any socializing of the costs of unemployment.l 
She continues and points out that "labor's opposition to experience 
rating has been based largely on the alleged consequences of this finan-
cial device, and notably on the importance which current formulas attach 
2 to compensable employment." 
Richard Lester points out, as we have seen in the final fonn of the 
TEUC bill, that "trade unionism has not been too effective politically 
in the area of unemployment compensation." 3 He attributes this fact, 
not to any fault of unionism, but to several other factors. At the 
State level, employer groups wield the most power. Also, the interstate-
competition argument (the effort to attract new industry by low tax 
rates) is very effective. At the national level, the House Ways and 
Means Corruni ttee and the Senate Finance Corruni ttee "are dornina ted by 
Southerners and conservative Northerners." 4 
Until 1958, the relationship between the Federal Government and the 
States in the unemployment insurance program had remained relatively 
l Burns, Socj a J $emn:jt y --.-, p. 168. 
2 Ibid., p. 169. 
3 Richard A. Lester, Ih.e Ecoooro:lcs .o.f. PoempJoymeot Compeosatiao 
(Princeton: Princeton University, Industrial Relations Section, 1962), 
p. 104. 
4rbid. 
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static. In fact, "the temporary program /_of 195.sl represented the first 
time that Federal action had been taken affecting the total amount or 
duration of benefits paid under State laws. 115 As a result, the proposed 
act was vigorously opposedo The various positions taken by opponents and 
proponents of the bill are surrmarized as follows: 
Those opposed to such action raised the issue of the invasion of States 
rights and argued that the States were in a better position than the 
Federal Government to judge their own needs in this area. Those in 
favor of Federal action emphasized that the seriousness of the exhaustion 
situation constituted a national problem and therefore this was a valid 
area for the Federal Government to act in; when the situation improved, 
the Federal program would cease.(78) 
As we have seen, the resulting compromise was a voluntary program 
assisted by the Federal Government. 
The many arguments presented by different interest groups will be 
presented in the following sections which deal exclusively with the 
TEUC Act of 1961. The basic philosophy of these organizations does not 
change radically from year to year. Hence, essentially the same philos-
ophy toward modification in the unemployment insurance program will be 
found in 1961 as was found in 1958. 
Financing: An Increase in the Taxable Wage Base Versus an 
Increase i n the Federal Unemployment Tax Rate 
With one exception, the proposals brought before the Committee on 
Ways and Means by Secretary of Labor Goldberg were drafted into the f i nal 
bill with only slight modification. The one exception was in the method 
of financing the proposed legislation. 
5House Committee on Ways and Means, Iempara ry J1oempJ aymeot Campeo-
satj on Hearings, 1961, p. 780 Since a major part of thi s chapter i s 
taken from the above source , hereafter r ef er ence wi ll be made t o the 
source by page number in the text. 
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Secretary Goldberg proposed to finance the bill by permanently in-
creasing the wage base subject to the Federal unemployment tax from 
$3000 to $4800. The main controversy concerned this feature of the bill. 
Lester cites three factors which explain the difference in opinion con-
cerning the proper way to finance unemployment compensation: 
1. Unemployment taxes levied on employers vary widely (a) between States, 
(b) within particular industries within a State, and (c) from year to year 
for many anployers. 
2. Unanployment taxation in addition to financing benefits, is designed 
to achieve a number of other objectives--employment stabilization, cost 
allocation according to presumed risk, employer policing of benefits, 
reduced taxes for employers, etc. 
3. Inadequate knowledge (370) 
He also points out that the question of a higher tax base or higher 
tax rates is "essentially ••• a question as to which employers should 
pay any increased tax burden and how that burden should be allocated 
among them." (379) It is evident that an increase in the tax base would 
throw the heaviest burden on industries paying high wages while industries 
with an average wage of close to $3000 would suffer relatively little 
from the widened base. Employers said that increasing the tax base was 
discriminatory on these grounds. They tended to associate high-wage in-
dustries to those who provide stable employment. The National Association 
of Manufacturers believed thats 
This action would tend to penalize the employer who conducts his operations 
in such a manner as to provide stable employment. The increased amount of 
taxes required as a result of extending the wage base will fall most heavily 
on the stable employer whose employees work regularly and earn upward of 
$4800 a year. (412) 
The Ohio Chamber of Corrmerce and other, related groups concurred in this 
opinion. 
However, Secretary Goldberg, in a prepared statement, related that~ 
. . • an increase in the rate of the Federal unemployment tax, whatever 
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it may be, will fall more heavily on industries paying $3000 or less than 
on industries paying more than $3000, if the tax base is left at $3000.(16) 
When State reserves have gone down, the pressure has generally been for 
an increase in maximum rates, rather than for an increase in the tax base. 
This has been based on the false assumption that unstable, high-benefit 
cost employers are also low-wage employers. To the contrary, I need only 
mention such industries as construction, steel, automobiles, as examples 
of high-wage industries whose benefit costs are high. But there is a 
practical limit to how far such increases may go. To the extent that a 
State cannot, or will not, raise the maximum rate beyond this limit, the 
burden must be shared by all employers, including those who would other-
wise be entitled to lower rates. (15) 
Experience Rating.--Employer groups also maintained that a wider tax 
base would destroy or seriously impair experience rating. Russell Bartley 
of the Illinois Manufacturers Association said that "a serious result of 
Federal standards would be the destruction of experience rating and the 
incentive for employers to stabilize their employment."(169) He added 
that "the experience rating formulas, which have been established through 
years of experience, would have to be completely changed by means of 
legislation in each of the States."(172) 
Robert Ewens, speaking on behalf of the Conference of State Manufac-
turers Associations, maintained that: 
Enactment of H.R. 3864 will tend to eliminate from an employer's 
consideration a genuine desire to retain his work force. He will know 
that his financial obligations may increase regardless of any employment 
stabilization efforts he desires.(247) 
The NAM added that because of increasing weekly benefits and low 
maximum tax rates, a wider tax base would only further narrow the ex-
perience rating tax range.(412) 
Arthur Goldberg anticipated these arguments. He took the opposite 
view as to the effects of a wider tax base on experience rating: 
In my opinion, increasing the tax base will preserve and make experience 
rating more effective. With a higher tax base, it is possible to have a 
wider range of tax rates for individual employers to more adequately 
reflect their individual cost experience. In this way, experience rating 
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with the higher tax base can yield the same income and, at the same time, 
more realistically reflect costs of individual employers to the system.(16) 
Both Secretary Goldberg and the employer groups were trying to pre-
diet the reaction of the States to an increased taxable wage base. If 
States did lower their tax rates in order to compensate for the increased 
taxable wage base, then the employer groups would have a valid argument. 
If, however, compensating measures were not taken on the part of the States, 
Goldberg's argument would have some merit. 
Competitjye DjsadyaotaQe ArQuroeots.--One of the alleged barriers to 
State unemployment compensation laws during the 1920's was the argument 
that employers in States enacting unemployment compensation laws would 
be placed at a competitive disadvantage with respect to employers in 
States not having these laws, and that the State itself would be at a 
disadvantage in the effort to attract new industry. Therefore, it was 
argued, a Federal law was needed so that all States would be taxed. 
However, in the years since the passage of the Social Security Act, 
States have developed a system of experience rating taxes that are widely 
varied among the States. Thus, the basic Federal law has been largely 
circumvented by the existence of differential benefit provisions and tax 
rates. In addition, this development in experience rating provides a 
strong argument for Federal standards in the taxation area. 
The competitive-disadvantage argument cropped up again in connection 
with the increased tax base. Secretary Goldberg argued that individual 
States have been reluctant to increase the tax base as a result of the 
fear that their State would be placed at a disadvantage in interstate 
competition for new industry.(15) R. L. Coffman, of the Texas Employment 
Commission, countered that "raising the tax base does not necessarily 
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get everybody on an equal basis because the State still has the right 
and privilege to adjust the tax rate ••• "(181) Coffman, however, 
along with five other directors of employment commissions, was not in 
opposition to the basic objectives of the TEUC billo The Ohio Chamber 
of Commerce also argued that States could adjust their tax rates thereby 
negating the purpose of the tax base increaseo (117) In reply to this 
argument it could be argued that the entire system of experience rating 
should be abolished. 
law .s.t.a.:t.e. Beserves.--At the time of the 1961 hearings, none of the 
17 States participating in the TUC Act of 1958 had repaid the Federal 
loans associated with financing the program. Goldberg used this as a 
reason for financing the 1961 program on a national basis through a 
widening of the tax baseo He argued that several States were annoyed 
with a serious unemployment problem while their unemployment reserves 
were quite low.(51) The increased base "would afford the States an 
opportunity to approach the problems of inadequate reserves and benefits 
in a more realistic manner."(16) If their reserves were adequate, there 
was nothing to stop a State from readjusting its tax rates.(56) 
Professor Sommers, representing the Americans for Democratic Action, 
added that "it would be unrealistic and fiscally unsound to expect such 
States ,Lthe 17 participating States under the 1958 act/ to borrow once 
again."(225) 
The opposing argument was simple: A State could produce added re-
venue by increasing its tax base, tax rate, or both. The Federal 
Government does not need to enforce an increase in the tax baseo 
Whether or not the States would in fact do these things was left unsaido 
Ib..e B.a.:ti.c. .o.f Taxable WaQes .t..c. I.o..ta..l Covered ~o--Perhaps the 
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strongest of the administration's arguments for an increased ta x base 
concerned the ratio of taxable wages to total covered wages. Goldberg 
pointed out that when the $3000 limit was established in 1939, 97 per 
cent of total covered wages were included by the $3000 limit. Since 
then, covered wages have increased so that, at the present time, only 
60 per cent of these wages are included in the $3000 limit. The $3000 
limit was imposed in 1939 to achieve technical conformity to the wage 
base of the OASDI tax.(15) The counter-argument by the Ohio Chamber of 
Commerce was: 
If the 1939 relationship between the wage base and the percentage of 
payroll covered by that base were to be maintained, a wage base in 
excess of $10,000 would be required. Any increase in the wage base of 
less than that figure must be purely arbitrary. A wage base of $4800 
has no more justification than any other amount between $3000 and $10,000. 
There is no relation between the wage base for OASDI purposes and 
the base used for unemployment compensation purposes.(116) 
In addition to th€ strong employer opposition as described above, 
other6 groups did not feel that temporary legislation should be financed 
by a pennanent tax feature. In any case, as we have seen in Chapter IV, 
this particular provision failed to materialize in the final draft of 
the bill. 
The AFL-CIO supported the administration measure, including the 
financing provision. They advocated, however, certain liberalizing 
changes in the bill and in the basic unemployment insurance program. 
Employer groups, on the other hand, sometimes questioned the need for a 
recession measure at all, and, in general, took a far more conservative 
6rhe Illinois, Texas, and Michigan Manufacturers Associations; 
the Texas Employment Corrmission; and the Associated Industries of New 
York, Inc. were opposed to a pennanent tax feature tied to a temporary 
program. 
64 
stand in their arguments concerning unemployment compensation. The em-
ployer arguments will be presented in the next section. Following this 
section, organized labor will be given equal space. 
Employer Opposition 
The administration stated the argument for financing the TEUC pro-
gram through the Federal Government as follows: 
Since no State is a self-contained economic unit, we should not expect 
a State to carry alone the crushing burden of long duration unemployment. 
This is especially so when the causes of prolonged unemployment cross 
State lines. The proposed financing would pool the risks and costs of 
recessionary unemployment, which is more a national than a State prob-
lan.(14) 
Generally, all employers organizations took a strong stand on the 
preservation of State autonomy. The NAM clearly stated "that all unem-
ployment compensation programs, emergency or otherwise, should be State 
programs." Also, "they should be administered by the States and the 
funds to support them raised within the individual States."(410) 
Federalization of the program was feared by the Illinois Manufac-
turers Association "because the payment of benefits by t he Federal 
Government is a radical departure from the established concept of bene-
fit payments." ( 169) 
The Conference of State Manufacturers Associations pointed out that 
an indicator of the States being aware of their own problems was the 15 
States that provided maximum duration of more than 26 weeks after the 
expiration of the 1958 TUC Act.(246) 
Spokemen for anployer groups were also skeptical as to whether the 
temporary extension of benefi ts conformed to the unemployment insurance 
phi losophy. The Michigan Ma nufacturers Association beli eved that the 
65 
TEUC provisions were "destructive of the basic philosophy of a system of 
State unemployment compensation laws, each adjusted to the particular 
needs of its own people."(415) The extension of benefits also would 
destroy the insurance principlei 
The pending proposal would change the unemployment compensation 
system from an insurance plan, where benefits are payable as of right 
based on past earnings, to a scheme for subsistence payments, something 
like welfare payments, but without a means test ••• (415) 
Arguments made by the NAM and the Conference of State Manufacturers 
Associations were essentially the same as the above statement. The NAM 
argued that unemployment insurance "cannot do the job Congress intended 
it to do if in the interest of expediency, it is converted into a psuedo 
relief program to take care of temporary recessions."(410) Likewise, 
the Conference of State Manufacturers Associations was of the belief 
that the TEUC Act would "convert what was always considered an insurance 
program, financed by employers only, into a giant relief measure that 
throws into discard insurance principles of long standing."(246) 
The coverage provided by the act was also attacked. It was charged 
that an increase in duration would benefit those persons no longer in 
the labor market more than those regularly attached to the labor force. 
(415) Also, it was argued, persons still in the labor force such as 
seasonal workers, part- time workers, and secondary wage earners comprised 
a large part of the exhaustees. 
Various other arguments related to the increasing cost burden 
through taxes placed on the employer. At the same time, an inflationary 
argument was used, implying that the added tax cost would be passed on to 
the consumer in higher prices. 
Generally we can say, then, that the business sector of the economy 
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took a more conservative view and sometimes a purely negative view 
toward extended benefits under the unemployment compensation program. 
Aside from a "leave-it-to-the-States" recommendation, business groups 
often fail to offer solutions which will come to grips with the basic 
problem. 
The Support of Organized Labor 
In the preceding section we found that employer groups took a 
strong States rights stand in regard to the unemployment insurance pro-
gram. At the other extreme, labor unions, we will find, press for 
Federal standards in the unemployment insurance program. However, the 
labor and employer arguments are alike in one respect; they both tend 
to emphasize certain aspects of the basic unemployment insurance system 
rather than the proposed modification. Management, on the one hand, 
emphasized the need to maintain the status quo. Labor, on the other 
hand, was more interested in the basic reform of the unemployment com-
pensation program. 
Nelson Cruikshank, speaking for the AFL-CIO, emphasized one of the 
basic policy issues involved in H. R. 38648 
••• there is the series of problems that arise when a temporary 
measure such as this is considered separately from pennanent improvements 
in the Federal-State system and thus necessarily tailored to the pattern 
of the existing program with all the deficiencies and shortcomings that 
program contains.(291-92) 
The essence of Cruikshank's argument was that Federal standards 
were needed in the program. By not having these standards, the Federal 
Government perpetuates and condones inequities in State laws. He charged 
that "the pattern of Federal aid in supplementing inadequate State unem-
ployment insurance" tends to make States delay on improvements in their 
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laws and take a "wait-and-see" attitude in regard to Federal action. 
Furthermore, the Federal Government becomes a party to inequities in 
State laws by tying duration to the length of benefits under State laws 
and by accepting State eligibility provisions. Temporary extensions of 
benefits have to conform easily to State laws; therefore, the Federal 
Government becomes a supporter of the inequities of these laws. 
He also pointed out the disadvantage of a temporary program with 
respect to the amount and timing of benefit payments as opposed to a 
good, permanent program.(293) He added that the need for temporary 
programs emphasizes the need for basic improvements in our present 
system. 
However, the AFL-CIO supported the TEUC bill. The greatest im-
provement of the 1961 act over the 1958 act, they claimed, was the fi-
nancing arrangement of the bill. They used essentially the same arguments 
in support of the widened tax base as the administration. The AFL-CIO 
did, however, recommend a federally prescribed minimum tax rate below 
which the State tax rates could not fall.(295) 
Only one other major objection was voiced by labor. Instead of 
letting the extension of benefits vary up to a maximum of 13 weeks, they 
would provide a flat thirteen-week extension to all exhaustees on the 
grounds that there wasn't "any justification in recession conditions of 
drawing any relationship between base year earnings and the length of 
entitlement to Federal benefits."(294) This view is closely analogous to 
Becker's welfare and competitive concepts of unemployment insurance as 
discussed in Chapter III. 
In conclusion, it is clear that organized labor is definitely con-
cerned with permanent unemplo,yment insurance reform. Perhaps Cohen is 
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close to the truth when he states that "the present attitude of organized 
labor toward social security is that a successful first step has been 
taken," 7 but that much more needs to be done. 
7Wilbur J. Cohen, "Attitude of Organized Groups Toward Social 
Insurance," RaadiQ'15 in Socia J Security , ed. William Haber and Wilbur 
J. Cohen (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948), p. 131. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
A strong case can be made for the temporary extension of benefitso 
The rates of exhaustion under the regular program of unemployment in-
surance were abnormally high during the relatively mild recessions of 
1958 and 1961. Many months during these two periods had an exhaustion 
rate in excess of 25 per cent. This one fact implies that State dura-
tion provisions are not adequate during recessionary periods. 
Does the temporary extension of benefits conform to generally 
accepted social insurance principles? A strong case can also be pre-
sented on the affirmative side. As Burns has pointed out,l there is a 
great deal of difference between the objectives and principles of private 
and social insurance. Also, the benefits drawn under the 1958 and 1961 
programs were still far removed from relief as we know it today. The 
temporary measures are even farther removed from the early measures 
(before 1935) designed to aid the destitute. Furthermore, it is diffi-
cult to conclude that the extended benefits were paid on the basis of 
need rather than as an earned right. Duration provisions of State laws 
are arbitrary and vary widely. Can we say that 26 weeks of benefits con-
forms to the insurance principle and then say that the last 13 weeks of 
benefits drawn under the Oklahoma law are relief payments? I think not. 
1 See pages 31, 32, 33. 
69 
70 
Benefits were still paid, under both temporary programs, according to the 
benefit fonnula established in each State. These fonnulas are, in turn, 
based on base-period earnings. Given the benefit formulas and the arbi-
trariness of duration provisions, it seems to follow that extended bene-
fits still reflect the past productivity of the workero 
On the basis of the contents of Chapter IV, the TEUC Act of 1961 
was somewhat more effective than the 1958 TUC Acto This fact is derived 
from the wider coverage of the acto Since more people were covered, 
given that the other provisions of the two acts were generally the same, 
it follows that more benefits were paid to a greater number of exhausteeso 
Also, in Chapter V, we found that various interest groups play an 
important and powerful role in the shaping of economic legislation. If 
we can classify groups into "liberal" and "conservative" elements, we 
find that, generally, employer groups take a much more conservative 
stand on legislation of this type than does organized labor. As a result 
of the powerful influence of employer groups, the most controversial fea-
ture of the 1961 bill (financing) conformed to employer demands. On the 
other hand, when we consider the various provisions of the bill rather 
than the bill itself, organized labor did not exert any appreciable in-
fluence on the final form of the legislation. However, the legislation 
itself probably would not have been passed without the active support 
of organized labor. 
Another important factor also emerges as a result of this paper. 
The fact that "stop-gap" programs were needed during the two recessions 
suggests that pennanent revisions are needed in the unemployment in-
surance program, especially in the areas of benefit amounts and benefit 
duration. Assuming that complete federalization is not feasible at this 
71 
time, either one of the following two approaches is preferable totem-
porary measures: (1) A system of State programs (with 100 per cent par-
ticipation) designed along the same lines as the "trigger mechanisms" 
enacted on the part of the five States mentioned earlier in this paper, 
or (2) a Federal program of extended benefits to be "triggered" into 
effect when the national rate of insured unemployment reaches a speci-
fied level. 
Under either program, the timing of the extended benefits could be 
superior to that in an emergency program. From a humanitarian standpoint, 
exhaustees would likely be provided with benefits more quickly than under 
emergency programs. From an economic standpoint, benefits could be 
channeled into the spending stream at the early stages of an economic 
downturn, thereby tending to modify periodic cyclical fluctuations. 
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